Popper, scientific blindspots and the subjective observer of objective events...

So, the investigation begins. I should start at the beginning really, it seems logical, and as a scientist, I am supposed to be one of those logical creatures – hmm…scientists as logical…that’s a topic for another days discussion.

Working in science I am a practitioner of the mode of thought called the hypothetico-deductive model of science. Now, even though I work in science, like many others around me, my education in the history of thought models that formed the scientific framework is shockingly poor. So if I make any mistakes in this introduction, then please illuminate me!

Thanks to Popper, and his ideas published on the scientific method between 1938 and 1963, we have a clear framework within which to investigate. We take an observation of the world and make predictions about what causes such an observation. This prediction takes the form of a hypothesis that can be falsified. We then construct a controlled, experimental situation that will determine whether our prediction is proved incorrect, or is upheld. While we can never determine a prediction to be true, we can determine if it is false and, consequently, if it needs to be adjusted.

Sounds simple huh? A rigorous and foolproof method for determining the nature of an external reality.

Except that I have some problems with this. Now I’m stepping out on my scientific limbs here, but just bear with me for the moment.

Firstly, the objective observer constructs an experimental situation. Inherent in this is the assumption that the objective observer is able to construct an ideally controlled environment in which to test the formulated hypotheses. Now to quote a good friend of mine, in cognitive neuroscience, we are using the brain to design experiments about how the brain works.

How do we know that the brain is able to formulate ways to test itself in an objective manner without limitations and blind spots?  What if the brain processes thought in a way that is unknowable to the thoughts derived from the processes?

Secondly, once our hypothesis is refuted, or upheld for the time being, we return to our observations, or what we know, to explain the phenomena under study.

How can we extrapolate our observations beyond what is already known? What if the phenomena’s true causes are yet unknown to us?

For example, we have known for a long time that neurons communicate via electrical activity across synapses.  Hypothetico-deductive research into brain function has been based on, and interpreted in terms of the body of knowledge relating to neuronal activity. Our observations upon neuronal firing have led us to conclude that this is how the brain processes information and communicates between areas.

Neurons are supported by glial cells. For a long time it has been assumed that glial cells physically support neurons, and modify the growth of neurons. And that’s it. However, recent research by R. Douglas Fields (The Other Brain, 2009: Simon & Schuster) indicates that in fact, these long overlooked cells form their own diffuse communication networks in the brain. In short, its like Parcelforce have been delivering plenty of packages while we’ve had our eyes only upon Royal Mail.

How does the presence of this new messenger impact upon what we have already assumed about the functions of Royal Mail? Do we need to return to these observations in order to understand them in the light of new knowledge? And if so, where does this leave the hypothetico-inductive method?

The rub, as Hamlet would say, is that while an experimentally controlled situation may yield the same observable event again and again, our understanding of it is dependent upon what is known at the time, by the individual in the cultural context, in a subjective moment.

Where does that leave objective knowledge?